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'I am grateful to participants in presentations  at the NBER Workshop on Economic Growth and at the
World Bank and to an anonymous  referee for useful comments.1.  INTRODUCTION
The economic  literature on developing  countries has long contained  arguments  that the large
growth differentials  among these countries could be explained by policy differences. Policies that
directly  distort relative prices and resource allocation - such as tariffs, import quotas, controls on
prices and interest rates, and discriminatory  taxes - have been particularly singled out to explain
differential  perforrnance of developing  countries (Balassa  (1985), Krueger (1978, 1983), Chenery et
al. (1986)).
However, according to the standard neoclassical  growth model due to Solow (1956),
distortionary  policie- affect only the level of income (and that modestly as dramatized  by the famous
Harberger triangles) and not its rate of growth.  The alleged long-run growth effects of distortionar
policy have also been dismissed in some "new" growth models (Lucas (1988) and Young (1991)).
The natural conclusion is that distortionary  policies are not that imnportant  in explairing large
differences  in economic  performance  (Rodrik (1991), Sachs (1987)).'
In contrast, authors such as Romer (1986, 1989), Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1993), Jones and Manuelli (1990), and Rebelo (1991) have presented models in which policies have
significant  effects  on long-run growth.  For example, in the area of fiscal policy, Barro (1990) has
discussed  how tax rates can distort savings decisions and lower growth, while government  se-vices
financed bv those taxes can potentially  raise private productivitv and increase growth.  A recent body
of work has calculated  the quantitative  impact of tax policy on growth rates. with results that range
from small (Lucas  (;990)) to large (King and Rebelo (1990), Rebelo and Stokey (1993)) to very large
(Jones. Ma.nuelli.  and Rossi (1993)).
However, the endogenous  growth literature has so far not given  much attention to the
distortions  of resource allocation commonly induced by policies in developing  countries. including
The  growth effects  of distorionary  policies  could  be preserved  in the Solow model  if we  focused  on the trnsition  to the  stdy state.
However,  King and  Rebelo  (1993) have convsncingly  demcnstrated  that the  Solow traition  can  explain  very l1t1.  of the long-run  growth
rate  without  generating  counterfactual  implications  for the interet rte.  Mankiw. Romer, end Weil (IM)  genete  a larger  role  for
transitional  dynamics  by rupposing  a high capital  share  including  human  capital.2
both tax and nontax policies.'  Tax systems in developing  countries often have a very narrow base,
because  of widespread  tax evasion and the small size of the formal sector (World Bank (1988)).
Generation  of revenue from this narrow base often implies very high tax rates.  A few examples help
illustrate  this.  More than 80 percent of income is .id  to go unrepo.ted in Argentina (ibid.).
Employment  in the privat^ formal sector in Cote d'Ivoire amounts to only 1.4 percent of the
population. Repeated  attempts  to increase tax revenue from the formal sector in Cote d'Ivoire have
:net with failure, as there is large-scale evasion  of taxes - which have an average effective  tax rate of
48 percent (Chamley  and Ghanem (1991)). Reliance  on taxes on international  trade is heavy in
developing  countries (particularly  in Africa where it amounts  to 35 percent of revenues), implying
that the tax system penalizes the use of imporLed  inputs in production (World Bank (1988)). Although
tax distortions  are also significant  in industrial countries (King and Fullerton (1984)), these examples
suggest another  order of magnitude  for deveioping  country distortions.
Besides  explicit fear'ires of the tax system, there are numerous oth  ways that governments  in
developing  countries intervene  to create large distortions  o. resource allocation. In addition  to explicit
taxes on trade, there are a host of other trade interventions  frequently used, such as import quotas  and
licenses  and multiple  exchange rates, which imply distortions  of prices of domestic  versus foreign
goods,  as well as among different types of foreign goods (World Bank (1987)).  Foreign exchange
controls lead to the creation of blacK  markets in foreign exchange, where the exchange  rate is a large
multiple  of the official  exchange rate.  Prior to reforms in Ghana in 1983. for example. the black
market exchange  rate was 44 times the official rate (Islam and Wetzel (1991)). Government
marketing  boards pay prices to domestic producers  of export commodities  that are a small fraction of
the international  price.
:An exception  is Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny ( 1991),  which shows  how rent-seekng in the presence  of distortions  can significantly
lower growth3
Controls on nominal interest rates often result in large negative real interest rates, while
quantitative  credit allocation rules imply large subsidies  for some types of capital and heavy implicit
taxes on others.  For example, credit for mortgage lending in Turkey was neavily subsidized  in the
early 1980s,  so that these borrowers paid highly negative real interest rates, while commercial  credits
for other types of loans carried real in!erest rates as high as 50 percent (World Bank (1989b)).
However, a large informal sector has sprung up side by side with the formal economy in
many developing  countries in response to distortionary  government policies.  De Snto (1989) has
convincingly  shown  how government regulation  led to a thriving informal sector in Peru.  Over half
of urban employment  in Africa is said to be in the int.-,rmal  sector (World Bank (1989a)). The illegal
economy in Ghana in 1982 was estimated to have accounted  for 32 percent of GDP (Islam and Wetzel
(1991))  The informal  sector often seems to provide a cushion to soften the impact  of even the most
extreme govermment  policies.  The depredations  of the Amir. government in Uganda caused formal
sector output to fall at 2 percent per year in 1970-78,  but subsistence  producticn continued  to grow at
3.4 percent per year (Reynolds  (1985)).
The multiple  distortions  described  here cften cause severe misalignment  of relative prices. For
example domestic  prices of some goods will be driven up through exorbitant tariffs or restrictive
quotas while  others receive preferential tariff or quota  treatment, or are held down by domestic price
controls. The model in this paper will show that the distortion of composition  of the aggregate  capital
stock resulting  from such interventions  can have large growth effects, just as the tax-induced
distortion  of the ratio of physical to iiulnan capital affe.cts  growth in Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi
(1993)  and Rebelo and Stokey (1993). The price distortions  can be measured di-ectly with the
commodity-by-comnodity  price data collected  by Summers and Heston (1988). This paper will
propose  a measure  of relative price distortion relevant  to long-run growth determination.  and
empirically  examine  its effects on growth.4
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II will present the basic model relating distortions
to growth, and show how it covers a variety of common  distortionary policies. Section m will present
empirical  testing of some of the implications  of the mode', deriving a new measure of the severity of
distortion of the price system. Section IV cancludes.
[I.  A MODEL  OF ENDOGENOUS  GROWTH  WITH DISTORTIONARY  POLICEES
This section  presents an endogenous growth model that attempts to capture some of the
special features of distortionar:,  government policy in developing  countries.  It postulates a model  of
constant  returns to scale in reproducible  capital, as in Rebelo (1991) and Barro (1990).3 Canital is
broadly defined to include both physical and human capital.  Two generic types of capital are defined
io produce  the single output - the types will be initially interpreted  as formal and informal stor
capital. The distortion  will be defined initially as a sales tax on investment  purchases in the formal
sector. The relationship  between  this distortion rate and growth will then be discussed.  Applications
to other policies will then be considered. Throughout the paper, we assume that the economy is
insulated  from international  financial markets, although trade in goods is considered. While the
model is highiy stylized, the results seem to give insight into some of the developing  country
characteristics  discussed  above.
The Model
Equation  (1) shows the production function for our analysis:
1
(1)  Y  =  A  (y  K1 +  (1  -y)  K2  )
'Tis  type of model  can also  be seen  as  a converuent approximaution  to a Solow model with a very high share of capital  including
hnan  capital), i:l which policies have such  large  level effects that they appear  to be growth effects.  Consunt  returns in  reproducible
capita.  allows  the denvaton of a rteadv state  that approximatea the transcuional  behavior  of a Solow model with high capital  share.5
Output is a CES function of the two generic types of capital, with elasticity  of substitution l/(e-1).
For simplicity, we assume population  to be fixed throughout  the analysis.
.aitially we interpret the two types of capital as being formal and informal sector capitil,
which are defined in terms of their location, ownership, and visibility  to the tax authorities. We
assume that the two types of capital can both be formed fTom  the domestic good with zero installation
cost, and that the economy is closed both to foreign trade and capital flows (in the next section, we
will show how some alternative  interpretations  ao not change the model). The distortion is a sales tax
on formal sector investmenm  purchases, which informal sector investment  purchases evade.
We assume that ideritical,  infinitely-lived  dynasties  of producer-consumers  maximize  the
present discounted  value of the utility of future consumption:
(2)  e  -Pt  cl  -a
Utility is given as an isoelastic  function of total consumption  C where the intertemporal  elasticity of
substitution  is I/a.
Consumption  is given by the excess of income over investment  spending:
(3)  C  =  Y  - (1+r)  I12  - 12  +  T
where r  is the rate of sales tax on purchases of investment  goods of the first type.  The variable  T is
the lump-sum  transfer of tax revenues back to consumers, ex-post equal to -r1, but treated by the
consumer  as fixed. Growth is unaffect, !, however, if the revenues are not rebated to the consumer.
The equations  of accumulation  of capital are:
(4)  K 1 =  I-  6K
(5)  K 2 =  12  - 2
where 6 is the rate of depreciation,  ass_med equal across capital types to simplify the algebra.  We do
not explicitly impose  the condition  that investment  is irreversible.6
The t.  t-order conditions  imply rhat the distortion will act as a wedge between  the marginal
products of the two types of capital, as follows:
(6)+76)  =  ~1  4  7
2
where T is the rate u.ax  on investment  in type I capital.  This implies the following  ratio of type 2
to type 1 capital (denoted '1), from (1) and (6):
K2 (1*Y)  (1+7)  1
KI  =
The distortion  r induces  more of type 2 cnpital  to be held relative to type 1 capital than is socially
optimal. The elasticity of subs.itution  (1/(e-1))  determines  how strongly the ratio of capital inputs will
respond to increases  in the distortion.
In steady state, consumption  and output will grow at the same rate, which will be given by:
r2  -j_p
(8)  g  --
where r, is the marginal product of type 2 capital, given by the following:
(9)  r  =  A  (I-y)  (y  4  6+  1-Y)
and 4)  is the ratio of K. to K, given by (7). Growth is giver. by the familiar condition  that optial
growth of consumption  is equal to the difference  between the net marginal product of capital and the
rate of time preference. times the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution. Since the marginal  product
of type 2 capital goes down when the ratio of type 2 to typt  I capital increases, which occurs when
type I capital is taxed more heavily, growth is unambiguouslv  a negative function  of the tax rate r.
A policy equivalence  that follows immediately  is that between a sales tax and an income  tax.
An income  tax on the income from formal sector capital that is evaded by holders of informal sector7
capital will enter in an exactly analogous  way as above (the income tax rate t equivalent  Lo a sales tax
7 is t =  r/(l +r)).'
The nature of lie relationship  betweei.  growth and distortion depends on the production
elasticity  of substitution  between the two types of capita'. Figure 1 shows a simulation  of growth rates
for plausible  parameter values with alternative  production elasticities. 5 The graphs are shown in terrms
^f the equivalent  income tax. With a high elasticity of substitution  in prudaction, even an income tax
rate close to unity could still permit positive per capita growth.  This is because when the elasticity of
substitution  is greater than one, neither input is essential  to production.  As the tax rate approaches
one, investrnent  in typu I capital asymptotically  approaches  zero.  However, production is still
possible  relying only on type 2 capital, and so the rate of return to type 2 capital remains positive.
W'hile  a high elasticity of substitution  may seem implausible  ir a model with only two inputs, it is
more prlausible  in a multiple input production function where many types of taxed capital goods will
have close substitutes  in the informal sectoe. A high elasticity of subsLitution  between  informal and
fcrmal capital could give insight into why even highly distorted economies could have less than
catastrophic  growth performancc  (such as Amin's Uganda, as cited earlier).
If the elastic..y of production  is less than or equal to one, then the level of output and the rate
of return to type 2 capital go to zero as the tax rate approaches one.  As the tax rate goes to unity,
economic  agents will decumulate  capital (assuming  no irreversibility in investment)  at a rate
((6  +p)/a).  Growth  also falls off more steeply at lower levels of the tax rate, as shown in figure 1.
There is an analogous  effect of the elasticity of substitution  on the welfare loss associated with
the distortionary  tax.  Figure 2 shows how the welfare loss is small at first, regardless  of the
'this equivalence is noted in another  context by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
nThe  parameter  values used for  the simulation  are A= .5. d  .05.  y = .5,  =2/3  =  2.  and a  =  I.  These values are arbitrarily
chosen to reproduce plausible ranges of growth  rates for illustrative  purposes.  The shape  of the growth-distortion  relationship is robust to
changes in these parameers except for the production elasticity of subsitution (as discussed in the text) and the intertemporml  elasticitv of
subritution  (not discussed here,  since  it is well known to control the str-ngth of the saving respons.  t  t.L changes).8
elasticity.'  This follows from the fact that a laissez-faire  zero tax policy is first-bes,z  which must
imply that the der,vative  of welfare with respect to the tax rate is zero at a zero tax rate.  As the tax
rate increases, welfare 'ils  off more sharply in the high elasticity case, then bottoms  out at a finite
level as the tax rate goes to one.  This occurs because the taxed input is inessential,  so even
eiirrmination  of the input's use only leads tO a finite, albeit  substantial, welfare loss.  As the use of the
input  apprcaches  zero, the marginal welfare loss of a higher tax cn that input is minimal. In the low
substitutability  case, the welfaru loss is not bounded since the taxed input is essential for production.
This idealized  framework  suggest that one's strategy in a highly distorted economy  should be
influenced  by one's assumption  about substitutability  of inputs in the production function.  If one
believes substitutability  is high, one should concentrate  on large reductions  in large distortions, sincz
moderate  reductions  have little benefit - a "Big Bailg" is needed.  If one believes substitutability  is
low, then any reduction in a large distortion will be beneficial - "gradualism" is a viable strategy.
It is also apparent from the maximization  problem above that a sales tax that applies only to
consumption  purchases will have no effect on growth. 7 With exogenous  labor supply, investment
price distortions  lower growth, but consumption  price distortions  do not. Since this result will be
tested in the empirical analysis, it is worth examining  how it compares with others iL the literature.
Consumption  taxes that are rebated lump-sum  to consumers affect growth in the endogenous  labor
supply models  oi Rebelo and Stokey (1993) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993) (with Lucas
'Welfare in steady  t  can be calculated as:
1  - a  Ip-g(i-a)
where  K, is the iniual level of the total capital stock  and  4  is  the ratio of consurnption to total capital stock, given as:
C,  + K_  (a  a
It can be shown,  however, that taxes on intermediste  goods act  much like taxes  on investment goods and ao  de affect ::rowth.9
(1988, 1990) "effective  labor"). However, Rebelo and Stokey (1993) show that consumption  taxes do
not affect growth if they are not rebated to consumers.'
The fall in growth as a result of the tax on capital is similar to results obtained by Barro
(1990), King and Rebelo.(1990),  and Jones and Manuelli (1990).  What is different here is that the
fall in growth occurs not only through a fall in ;  vestment, but also in the efficiency  of investment.
An increase in the distortionary  tax rate will lower growth even for a fixed rate of total investment  to
output (defined  as the sum of the two types of investment  as a ratio to output). Rebelo and Stokey
(1993) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1993)  show related compositioncl  e&fects  of tax policy on the
rat  ios of human to physical capital.
It is also apparent from (7)-(9) that a negative  value of r, i.e. a subsidy to investment  in type
I capital financed by lunp-sumn  taation,  will raise growth. Although lump-sum  taxation is unrealistic,
this result would also occur with a subsidy to one type of investment  financed  by a tax on
consumption,  since the latter has no growth effect. This is an example of the well-known  possibility
of imrniserizing  growth,.since welfare is worsened but growth increases  due to the subsidy. It is still
true, however, that a higher subsidy will lower growth for a given rate of saving and in,,tsnment;  the
increase in growth comes about  through higher investment,  partially offset by lower efficiency  of
investment.
Self-financing  subsidy and tax schemes
Thus far we have considered  only policies that implicitly  tax one form of capital. assuming
the proceeds  are dissipated in lump-sum  transfers.  Other policies have the character of taxing one
'This result is a consequence of the restrictions on the utility funcuon  rcquired to  generte  a  tAdy oute growth path with a constnt
fraction of time devoted to leisure,  which requires that income and substitution  effects of wage changes cancel out,  as pointed out earliie by
King, Plosser,  and Rebelo (1988).  Rebelo and Stokey (1993) also show that if leisure  is  *quality-adjuated  (i.e. multiplied by the level of
human capital), then consumptiousixes  do not affect  growth regardless of whether the taxes are rebated or not.10
type of capital and using the proceeds to subsidize  another.  For example, price controls act as a
subsidy  to the use of the controlled-price  goods, implicitly  financed by taxes on other goods. 9
Using the framework of the previous section, we now assume investment  in capital type I is
taxed at rate r, and that the proceeds are used to finance a subsidy to capital type 2 at rate s.  The
first-order  condition (7) for the allocation of capital will be modified to be:
(II)  1.  =  ..  ~  1=  1
(  )  r1~K [ [  ry-  I I I, sl  I]
The requirement  that the scheme be self-financing  imposes the condition:
(12)  2=
For a given subsidy  rate s, (11) determines  the allocation of capital between  types and (12) determines
the tax rate necessary  to finance the subsidy. The growth rate expression (8) will now be modified to
be:
:2  - 8 -p
(13)  1=  ls
An increase in the self-financing  subsidy  will have two offsetting effects on the growth rate.
The increase in the subsidy makes accumulation  of type 2 capital more attractive. and tends to raise
growth, as in the previous section.  However, the before-subsidy  marginal product cf type 2 capital
will fal: because  of the substitution  from type 1 to type 2 capital, which is induced  by the subsidy and
by the tax necescary  to finance the subsidy.  Appendix  I shows that the second effect always
outweighs  the first: the net effect is that growth unambiguously  falls with an increase in the rate of
subsidy  financed by a tax on capital.
'Mis  is presumrng that  the pnce  controls are accompanued  by budgetary transfers to  compensate the producer for the lower pnce.
Otherwise, shorages  and black market  pnces  anse.  Just  as  in the case of foreign exchange  controls (6ee below).11
Other policy applications
The analysis  has been presented thus far in terms of a sales tax or subsidy (or equivalent
income  tax) on formal sector capital in the presence of an informal sector.  We now show some other
examples  of policies that give similar results, illustrating  that the framework is general enough to
consider  a range of distortionary policies.
1.  Financial  repression
Controls on interest rates below market levels generally lead to quantitative  credit allocation
by the formal financial  system, combined with a flourishing  "curb" market formed by consumers  or
producers  who lend to each other at market rates.  The quantitative  credit allocation rules are of en
designed  to promote certain kinds of activities, for example, small-scale  enterprises or agriculture
(World  Bank (1989b)). In terms of this model, we can ti  'k  of a credit subsidy being given to all
who invest in a particular kind of capital goods (type 2 capital).  We can assume that the subsidy is
financed  by an implicit tax on the non-subsidized  capital (type 1 capital).
2.  Trade  policy
We could next redefine the two types of capital to be imported capital (K,) and domestically
produced  capital (KY),  and redefine the tax rate r as a tariff on imported goods.  We assume  that the
domestic good is also traded internationally  and that the country is a price-taker (the international
price ratio of the two goods is fixed at unity for convenience). The tariff then acts as a tax on type I
investment  goods. Equaily, both types of goods could be imported, and the tariff structure imply a
tax-cum-subsidy  scheme in favor of some types of investment  goods.  Thus, both a higher level and a
greater dispersion  of tariffs (or equivalent quotas) will result in lower growth according to this model.
3.  Exchange  rate policy
When  exchange rate controls in developing  countries lead to black markets in foreign
exchange, foreign  exchange is typically allocated at the official rate so as to favor certain activities.12
In terms of this model, a foreign exchange allocation  that grants foreign exchange at the official rates
for goods that make up capital type 2, and does not grant any for investment  in type 1 goods, will
imply a tax-cum-subsidy  scheme  with the wedge between  the two goods equal to the black rnarket
exchange rate premium.
4.  Price controls
Price controls  on particular goods are a common feature of developing  country policies. For
example,  coal prices are often controlled to be below international  levels in many countries (World
Bank (1988)). The coal subsidy is financed by other revenues  fror- the govemment budget. This is
equivalent  to the tax cum subsidy  scheme discussed in the  previous section. Since distortions  2. and
3. above also affect the price system, this suggests  that a comprehensive  measure is needed to capture
all of the complicated  and possibly  offsetting relative price distortions  inherent in government
policies.
M. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Although  a large literature exists relating policy variables to growth, there have been few
attempts  to measure  price distortions  directly.  This section proposes  a new measure of relative price
distortion  and tests its relation  to growth, along with other distortion measures  used in other studies.
We discuss first the variables, and then discuss the results.
Variables
1. Price distortions
One way to measure indirect  distortions  of prices, like those analyzed  in the previous section,
would  be to look directly at observed retail prices across countries. Summers  and Heston (1988)
collected data on 1980 benchmark  prices relative to the U.S. for 57 countries and 151 commodities.13
We construct a measure of the variance  of relative prices across commodities  for each country and
interpret  this as a measure of overall distortion of the p;ice system. There are two adjustments  that
need to be made. First, the variance of each commodity's price across countries due to differences in
natural resource  endowments  needs to be removed. Although theoretically  this is necessary only for
nontraded  commodities,  even traded commodities' domestic  price may contain a nontraded component
due to retailing and transportation  costs.  This is done by isolating the orthogonal component of each
of the log of the 151 prices with respect to per capita income.  Secondly,  the  ii.; predicts that only
distortions  in prices of intermediate  inputs and investment  goods matter. We i  implication  of
the theory by computing  separately  cross-commodity  variances for consumptioL ,oc '  and for
investment/intermediate  goods (human  capital inputs such as health and education  were al'o included
under investment  - Appendix m contains  the list of commodities).  We use the same data to compute
the expenditure-weighted  mean of the orthogonalized  logs of relative input/investment  prices.  We
then compute for each country  the expenditure-weighted  sum of squared deviations of each
commodity's  orthogonalized  log price from the log mean.' 0
Appendix  II shows the variance and mean of input prices for each country. The countries
with the highest  variance of relative input prices in 1980 are Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, and
Indonesia. All of these countries partially compensate  with cheap prices for inputs and investment
goods. Cote d'Ivc.re, Nigeria, Senegal, and Carneroon  have the highest average input prices.
Industrial  countries  generally have low distortions of relative input prices, and neither very high nor
very low average input prices.  Table I shows the mean and variance of these and the other distortion
measures.
°This is  aimrilar  to the clever procedure  followed by Aitken ( 1991) to  compute a measure of distoruon.  However,  Aitken aggregates
commodities  into 16 categones  before computing cross-commodity vanances,  he does not distinguish between congumpuon  and  investment
goods.  and he does not relate his index to growth.  I am  grsteful to  Brian Aitken for  supplying the Summers-Heston price data  in convenient
format.14
Table 1:  Descriptive  statistics for  Sample  Sample  Number of
distortion  measures  mean  standard  countries in
deviation  sample
Mean across input categories  of log of ratio  -0.230  0.458  57
of input  prices to U.S. price (orthogonal
component  to income), 1980
Variance  across input categories  of log of  0.241  0.158  57
ratio of input prices to U.S. price
(orthogonal component to income),  1980  _
Mean across consumption  categories  of log  -0.160  0.333  57
of ratio of consumption  prices to U.S. price
(orthogonal  component to income)  ,  1980
Variance across consumption  categories  of  0.230  0.149  57
log of ratio of input prices to U.S. price
(orthogonal  component to income), 1980
Log of ratio of black market to official  0.194  0.251  106
exchange rate, average  1970-85
Average  real interest rate, 1970-85  (used to  -3.58  8.95  53
define financial  repression dummy)15
Earlier results for growth using the Summers  and Heston price data were found by Dollar
(1992)  and De Long and Sumners (1991).  Dollar tested a measure of exchange rate overvaluation
constructed  as the average price level in each country relative to the US, corrected  for differences in
resource  endowments,  and found overvaluation  to significantly  lower gru.  .th.  De Long and Summers
found that high relative equipment  prices significantly  lower growth.
2.  Financial  distortions
We extend a dataset from Gelb (1989) of real interest rates for developing  countries, adding
observations  for developed countries.  A highly negative  real interest rate is interpreted  to imply the
existence  of nominal interest rate controls (moderately  negative real interest rates have been observed
for reasonably  long periods even in countries with uncontrolled interest rates).  We follow World
Bank (1989b) in defining "financial  repression" as an average real interest rate below -5 percent over
1970-85  'period varies depending on data availability)  - there are 14 such countries (out of 53). We
will examine  robustness  to other cutoff points as well as to the use of a continuous  variable.  Gelb
(1989) found real interest rates to be significantly  correlated with growth. Fischer (1983, 1991)  and
Kormendi  and Meguire (1985) report a possibly related finding of a negative effect of inflation  on
growth.
3.  Black market  premium
The black market premium is defined as the log of the ratio of the black market to the official
rate over roughly 1970-85  (period varies with data availability), based on data from Pick's Currency
Yearbook  and the World Bank.  Levine and Renelt (1992) found this variable to have a significant
effect on investment,  although  not on growth, Easterly (1991) found it to be a good predictor of
whether  countries  are caught in a low-level equilibrium  trap.16
4. Government  conswnpnon
Government  consumption  has been found to be negatively  related to growth by Barro (1991),
Grier and Tullock (1989), Landau (1986), and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991). In terms of the
model in section II, govermnent  consumption  is an indicator of high taxes on the formal sector.
5.  Barro correlates
In addition  to these measures  of distortion of resource allocation, we also test for correlates
reported by other studies, taking Barro (1991) as the benchmark  study. We focus on initial income,
primary enrollment, and secondary  enrollment. We also use the same dependent variable (per capita
growth 1970-85  from Summers  and Heston (1988)) as Barro for ease of comparison. Finally, the
investment  rate (also from Barro/Summers  and Heston) is added to the equation to test the implication
of the model that distortions  lower growth concrolling  for investment.
Empirical result
Table 2 shows the results.  Both the mean input price and the variance of input prices across
commodities  are significant. The variance result is consistent  with the prediction of the model in
section II - in a multiple input world, distortions  of relative prices away from world prices will lower
growth.  The magnitude  of the variance coefficient is such that increasing  the variance of relative
prices from the sample mean of .24 bv one standard deviation  to .40 will lower growth by 1.2
percentage  points.
The significance  of the mean input price is reminiscent  of the De Long and Summers  (1991)
finding  that cheap investment  equipment  is good for growth. Here we find more generally that cheap
inputs -- including  intermediate  inputs, education,  health, buildings  and equipment  investment  - are
good for growth. This result confirms  the prediction  of the model that subsidizing  inputs is a feasible
way to raise growth (although  irnmiserizing  unless there are externalities). When the equipment  price17
variable  is added, neither price is significant  -- we cannot distinguish  between the two - but the
v?riance  of input prices continues  to be significant  (regression VI).
The financial  repression dummy is also highly significant, with a coefficient indicating  a loss
of about 1.5 percentage points in growth due to financial repression. Th  does not appear to be a
proxy for high inflation, which was insignificant  when tested separately. The implicit taxes from
highly negative  real interest rates apparently  fall on productive investment. If we accept regression I
as a valid reduced form, these three distortion variables (with government  consumption)  explain half
of the cross-section  var dz,.e in growth rates.
The financial  repression dummy, and the mean and variance of input prices continue to be
significant  when investment  is added (regressions  II and EII). Growth  falls for a given rate of
investment  falls when relative input prices are heavily distorted, when inputs are expensive, and when
interest  rates are repressed.  The significance  of the financial repression dummy and the variance of
input  prices confirms the efficiency  effects predicted by the model in section II.  The significance  of
mean input prices does not at first seem to conform to the prediction of the model that a uniform tax
on all inputs should affect the level of investment,  but not the efficiency  of investment. However,
since investment  here includes  only physical capital, the result may reflect higher productivity  of
physical  capital with cheaper intermediate  and human capital inputs.
Because  investment  is likely endogenous,  we show also a regression (Ia)  with an
instrumental  variables estimator, using as instruments  for investment  the other right-hand  side
variables as well as continent  dummies for Africa and Latin America, a dummy variable for oil
producers, and the population  size in 1960. The coefficient  on investrnent  is increased, but the
coefficients  on the other variables are roughly unchanged.18
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Table 2 Variable  definitions:
Average  input  price:  Expenditure-weighted  average across categories of inputs and investment  goods
listed in Appendix  III for 1980 orthogonalized  log of dolhar  price relative to the U.S.
Variance  of input prices:  Expenditure  weighted  variance  across input and investment  good categories
for 1980 orthogonalized  log of dollar price relative to the US.
Government  consumption: Summers and Heston ratio of real government consumption  to GDP,
1970-85  (Barro variable HSGOV)
Financial  repression dummy:  1 if country has average real interest rate for 1970-85  less than -5
percent, 0 otherwise (periods of average may vary depending  on data availability)  [From Gelb (1989)
and World Bank datal In regression IVa, the dummy variable is replaced by the actual average real
interest rate over 1970-85  (notice interpretation  of the sign of coefficient will be reversed); in
regression  Vila, the dumnmy  variable is replaced  by a dummy variable where the dummy is equal to
one if the average reai interest rate is less than -2 over 1970-85
Total investment: Summers and Heston ratio of real investment  to GDP (Barro variable HSINV)
Mean consumption  price:  Exper-diture-weighted  average across categories of consumption  goods
listed in Appendix  II for 1980  orthogonalized  log of dollar price relative to the U.S.
Variance  of consumption  price:  Expenditure-weighted  variance across categories  of consumption
goods  for 1980  orthogonalized  log of dollar price relative to the U.S.
Mean of equipment  price:  Expenditure-weighted  average across categories of equipment investment
for 1980  orthogonalized  log of dollar price relative to the U.S.
Black market  premium:  Log of ratio of black market to official exchange rate [World Bank data]
Initial  income: Summers and Heston real per capita GDP in 1960 (Barro variable GDP60)
Primary  enrollment: Barro variable PRIM60
Secondary  enrollment: Barro variable SEC60
Note: orthogonalization  is with respect to log of per capita income.20
When  we add the analogous  measures  of the mean and cross-commodity  variance of
consumption  good prices, we find that they are insignificant,  while the mean and variance  of input
prices continue  to be significant  (regression V).  This is consistent with the prediction  of the model
that consumption  price distortions  do not matter but input price distortions  do.'"
The significance  of the mean and variance of input prices is robust to the inclusion  of
correlates  reported  by Barro (regression IV).  The same cannot be said for the financial  repression
dummy,  whose significance  is weakened  when the Barro correlate,s  are added.
We also examine the robustness  of the resu!i on the financial repression variable by
considering  alternative  definitions of "repression". Redefining  repression as less than a -2 percent real
rate of interest increases  the number of repression cases from 11 to 19 countries in the sample  of 51
(regression VIla). The redefined repression variable has the same sign but generally falls short of
significance.  On the other hand, a continuous  varia3le for the real interest rate is still significant  at
roughly the same or higher level as the current dummy  variable. The continuous  variable retains
significance  in the Barro regression (regression IVa).  Note that because of the redefinition  of the
variable, the sign here is the opposite of the dummy vaziable  but still has the interpretation  that
negative  real interest rates are bad for growth. The continuous  variable may be more likely than the
dummy  variable  to capture other sources of variation than just the degree of financial  repression,
however. We conclude  the evidence  for effects of financial distortions  on growth is suggestive,  but
far from conclusive.
There is some evidence  for effects of other distortion  variables on growth.  The black market
premium is significant  in an equation with financial repression and governrment  spending (regression
VlT),  but its significance  disappears  when the mean and variance of relative input prices (and the
"We  also  tried Dollar's  (1992) measure of exchange rate overvaluation,  which is closely  related to the mean consumption price, and
found it to be inuignaicant.21
Barro correlates)  are added (regression  IV).  The same is true for the share of governrnent, whose
significance  also disappears  when investment  is added (regression  O).
The strongest results are those for the new measures of price distortion. The results can be
illustrated  by looking  at three data points: Ch!le. Korea, and Zambia, using regression m as the
benchmark. All three had roughly the same investment  rates, around 27 percent of GDP, but Korea
had high growth (6%) and Chile (0%) and Zambia (-2%) had low growth.  A significant portion of
the difference  in growth rates can be explained  by regression IH.  Chile and Zambia both had high
negative  real interest rates (in Chile's case, mainly during the 70-73 Allende regime and its
aftermath), which itself lowers growth by 1.6 percentage  points. Korea and Chile both implicitly
subsidized  input investment  goods  heavily on averaig, while Zambia implicitly  taxed them - this
explains over 2 percentage  points of Zambia's lower growth compared to Korea.  On the other hand,
while Korea and Zambia only had moderately distorted prices between types of inputs, Chile's were
heavily distorted. The high variance of input prices cost Chile 1.6 percentage  points of growth
compared to Korea.  It is interesting  that Korea was not a case of "getting  prices right", but rather
one of heavy subsidization  of inputs, which implies growth was "too high" by about one and a half
percentage  points if no externalities  are assumed.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
A simple  model of endogenous  growth with two types of capital shows that distortions of
relative input prices can have large effects on growth and welfare.  The magnitude  of the effect
depends on the production  elasticity of substitution. With high substitutability,  the effects on growth
and welfare are bounded -- albeit possibly large  -- no matter how  high the rate of distortion.
Subsidization  of inputs and investment  goods can raise growth, even though they worsen welfare. But
a subsidy  to one capital good financed by a tax on another capital good unambiguously  lowers22
growth. Empirical results show strong negative  effects of the variance of relative prices of investment
goods across sector, while also confirming  and extending  earlier results that penalizing  investment
goods and distorting ;.nancial markets lowers growth.23
APPENDEI I: effect on growth of a self-rinancirng  subsidy-cum-tax policy
As outlined in the text, an increase in a subsidy  to type II capital financed  by an increased tax rate on
type I capital  always lowers growth.  To show this, it is sufficient to s'"ow that the tax increase
necessary  to finance  the increased subsidy is greater than the tax increase that would  just maintain  the
growth rate fixed (since a tax increase by itself unambiguously  lowers growth,.  From (11) and (12)
in the text, the balanced  budget requirement means that s and 7 must satisfy:
(A. 1)
The derivative  of r with respect to s from (A.  1) (using (A.  1) itself to simplify) is:
(A.2)  d.r a  s  (A)  i-)
(I'S  _(  )(t)
Note th  it it  -0  (elasticity of substitution >  1), then as the tax rate approaches  (1-e)/e, the further
increase is=  rate necessary to finance the subsidy goes to infinity.  With elastic substitution
possibilities,  i,h!'re  is a limit on the subsidy rate that is feasible under a subsidy-cum-tax  scheme. If
. s 0, then any subsidy rate less than one is financeable.
From (3) in the text, the combination  of 7 and s that yield a constant growth rate g is given by:
(A.3)  E  2k  (t ts}  8  +prg
where the {}  denotes "function  of ".  The right-hand  side of (A.3) is constant by assumption;  g is the
growth rate cnsistent  with the initial  J  and s. The derivative  of T with respect to s from (A.3) can be
radically  simplified  to:
(A.4)  dt  t 
ds  s
where we use the fact that  k2  =  /s  at the initial point.  Comparing the derivatives  in (A.2) and
k'
(A.4), we see that (A.2) is unambiguously  larger.  This says that the tax increase  necessary to raise
the revenue  to finance a given subsidy  rate increase is larger than the tax rate increase that would  just
maintain  the growth rate constant.  Since an increase in the tax rate for a given rate of subsidy  always
lowers  growti. this says that an increase in the subsidy rate on type II capital financed by an increase
in the tax rate on type I capital unambiguously  lowers growth.24
Appendix 11 Measur  of distorton  by country
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.kppendix  m Goods for Calculation of consumotion  cnd input price averates  and varisence
ConsumnpDoo  Goods
lnatenediast  laput  and  Lnveazmeat  Goods
Rice  Drugs,  medical  prepanrioos
Meal,  ither  cereals  Medical cuppLiea
Bread  Therapeuuc equipment
Biscuits.  cakes. etc.  Physicians' equipment
Cerel  preparation  Denutu'  servic4m
Mc.aroru. spaghetti  Nurses' service
Fresh  beaf, veal  HogpitAle
Fresh lanb, munon  Personal automobiles
Fresh pork  Other peron  traport
Freah poultry  Til".  tub"s,  aiessories
Other fresh meat  Automobile  puairs
Frozen and alted  meat  Gasolne, oil. gpea.
Freah and  frozen fiah  Pc.rking, 'olls, ec.
Canned  fish  Local uansport
Freh milk  RAil  tranport
Milk producu  Bus tranporn
Eggs,  egg  producta  Air tasport
Butuer  Posal  communication
Margerine,  edible oil  Telephone. telegrnph
LArd, edible fat  Books, paper.  magazin
Fresh tropical fruita  Sutionery
Other  fresh fruits  Fun  and econd-level  teachers
Fresh vegetAblea  College teachers
Fruit other than freh  Physical facilities for education
Vegetables other than fresh  Educational books, supplies
Tubers, including pocAtoes  Other oduca  ocAl expenditures
Coffee  Hotels
TeA  Industrial  butidings
Cocoa  Commercial buildings
Sugar  Ofice  building
lam, syrup,  honey  Educanonal buildings
Chocolate,  ice cream  Hospital buildings
Salt, spices, sauces  Agricultuml buildinpg
Non-alcoholic  bevergea  Other buildingv
Spirits  Roadc, suee,  highways
Wine, cider  Truport  and udlizy lines
Beer  Other conauction
Cigarettes  LAnd  improvement
Cigars, tobacco, *nuff  Locomotives
Clothing mntariala  Other railway  vehice
Men's clothing  Pasenger  aut4mobile
Women's  clothing  Trucks, buse,  trilers
Boys' and  girls' clothing  Aircft
Men's and boys' urderwear  Ships, boats
Women's and  girOs'  underwear  Other trranport equipenent
Haberdashery, millinery  Engine,  turbines
Clothing  renta  nd repair  Tractor
Men's foorwear  Other agriculturaL  machinery
Women's footwear  Offic  machinery
Children's footwear  Metalworking machiney
Foorwear, repain  Conatrucuon. mining  machinery
Furniure  Fixzures  Special industnsl  machinery
Floor coverings  Electrical tranamission equipment
Household  texules, etc.  Commurncations equipment
Refrigerators, freiere  Other electrical equipment
Washing  appLiance  Inruments
Cooking Appliances  Furdtutre., Exures




Nondurable  household goods
Domestic  services
Household  setvices
Barber and  beaury shops
Toilet artcles




Expendicurea  of resident  ebroad
Ono and  tw'--family  dwellings
Multifamily  dwellings26
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